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· Th~ defendant by the Information in this action was 
charged with the commission of the crime of rape, upon his 
8 year old daughter Cynthia Winget. The action was tried 
in Sevier County, Utah, on November 26 and. 27th, 1956. 
On November 27, 1956 the Jury returned a verdict of guilty, 
and on December 10 1956 Motion f.or New Trial was denied 
' ' 3.nd defendant was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment in 
the Utah State Penitentiary. He appeals. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Cynthia Suzanne Winget is the 8 year old daughter of 
defendant and his former wife, Marjorie L. Winget. She 
testified that on Sunday September 2, 1956, she and her two 
brothers went to visit her father, the defendant, at their 
.grandfather's home. The defendant was alone in the home 
and that while her two younger b1.1others were outside play-
ing, her father had improper relations with her. She didn't 
relate this to her mother until the following Monday even-
ing when she noticed a bleeding and her mother took her to 
a doctor for an examination the following Tuesday. (T 6-14). 
Dr. Gaylord Buchanan testified that he performed a 
pelvic examination on the child and found no active bleeding 
at that time but evidence of abrasion and of the tear or lacer-
ation at the base of the hyman was still present (T p 52-53). 
The doctor stated that it was quite p1.1obable that this injury 
could·have been caused by a male penis. (T p 54) but on cross 
examination agreed that it could have been caused by sev-
eral things within his realm of speculation (T p 56). 
The prosecution as part of its case in chief called as a 
witness Marlene Johnson, a half sister of Cvnthia Suzanne 
Winget, who t~stified that in about 1948 and 1949 when she 
was between 8 and 9 years of ag·e and while her mother was 
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married to the defendant, that on one occasion during the 
summer the defendant raped her, and on another occasion 
in the summer of 1950 at Boulder Mountain, Utah, when she 
was between 9 and 10, the defendant again raped her. 
(T p 39-40-41-42) and that he did so again in 1952 when she 
was 12 (T 42-43) and also repeated the act a month later 
(T p 44). The admission of this testimony was objected to 
by counsel for defendant, but the objection was overruled by 
the Court (T p 38 and 39). The witness Marlene Johnson, 
was at the time of the trial, 17 years of age. (T p 37). She 
testified she did not relate these incidents to her mother 
until just before her mother and the defendant were divorced 
(T p 46) which was in 1952 (T p 31). 
The defendant, Keith Winget took the stand in his own 
behalf and denied that he had ever raped Cynthia Suzanne 
or Marlene or had improper relations with them (T p 65-66). 
He testified he and his former wife were divorced in 1952 
(T p 59). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO LAW 
AND THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR OFFENSE 
COMMITTED BY DEFENDANT, PRIOR IN TIME TO 
1'HE DATE ON WHICH THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE 
INFORMATION WAS ALLEGED T'O HAVE BEEN COM-
MITTED, WITH A DIFFERENT PARTY. 
POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN CHARGING 
THE JURY AS P'ER HIS INST'RUCTION NO. 9. 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
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ARGUMENT 
. POINT I. THE VERDICT IS CONTRARY TO THE 
LAW AND THE EVIDENCE. 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
TESTIMONY AND EVIDENCE OF A SIMILAR OFFENSE 
COMMITTED BY DEFENDANT, PRIOR IN TIME TO 
THE DATE ON WHICH THE CRIME CHARGED IN THE 
INFORMATION WAS ALLEGED TO HAVE BEEN COM-
MITTED, WITH A DIFFERENT PARTY. 
Because Point I and Point II are very closely connected 
and because defendant contends the verdict rendered was 
contrary to law by reason of the improper admission of the 
testimony of Marlene Johnson, which, in a case such as this 
where a man is tried for a crime so heinous and base that it 
inflames the minds of even the most prudent, this testimony 
could not have done otherwise than influence the jury in 
their verdict, defendant will present his argument under the 
first two points, together. 
In this action in the State's case in chief the testimony 
of Marlene Johnson now of the age of 17 years, a half sister 
of the prosecutrix, was admitted over the objection of de-
fendant was to the effect that the defendant had on four 
separate occasions, some 8 or 9 years ago, when the witness 
was between 8 and 9 years of age, and again when the wit-
ness was about 9 or 10 years of age, raped her. These inci-
dents· were wholly unconnected with the crime charged and 
such testimony should never have been admitted in evidence 
before the Jury. 
It is a well settled rule of law that evidence of other and 
distinct crimes are generally inadmissible. 
·It is said in Underhill on Criminal Evidence, 3rd Edition, 
Chapter XV. Section 150: 
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"General rule regarding ·evidence of crimes other 
than that charged in the indictment. - The rule 
which requires that all evidence which is introduced 
shall be relevant to the guilt or the innocence of the 
accused is applied with considerable strictness in 
criminal proceedings. The wisdom and justice of 
this, at least from the defendant's standpoint, are 
self -evident. He can with fairness be expected to 
come into court prepared to meet the accusations 
contained in the indictment only, and, on this ac-
count, all the evidence offered by the prosecution 
should consist wholly of facts which are within the 
range and scope of its allegations. The large major-
ity of persons of average intelligence are untrained 
in logical methods of thinking, and are therefore 
prone to draw illogical and incorrect inferences, and 
conclusions without adequate f.oundation. From such 
persons jurors are selected. They will very naturally 
believe that a person is guilty of the crime with 
which he is charged if it is proved to their satisfac-
tion that he has committed a similar offense, or any 
offense of an equally heinous character. And it can-
not be said with truth that this tendency is wholly 
without reason or j ustificaion, as every person can 
bear testimony from his or her experience, that a 
man who will commit one crime is very likely subse-
quently to commit another of the same description. 
To guard against this evil, and at the same time to 
avoid the delay which would be incident to an indef-
inite multiplication of issues·, the general rule (to 
which, however, some very important exceptions may 
be noted) forbids the introduction of evidence which 
will show, or tend to show, that the accused has com-
mitted any crime wholly independent of that offense 
for which he is on trial. (Cases cited)****" 
Among the cases cited are two Utah cases, namely: 
State v. Baum, 47 Utah 7, 15l,Pac. 518, in which it was 
held it was not proper to show convictions of prior offenses 
to prove probabilities that the defendant was guilty of the 
charged offense, or to show criminal propensities. In this 
case the District Attorney attempted to prove prior convic-
tions in his main case. 
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State v. Williams, 36 Utah 273, 103 .Pac. 250, wherein 
it was held in a prosecution for rape it was reversible error 
f()r the state on cross-examination of the accused to compel 
him over objection to answer questions conveying the idea 
that he had permitted other children to call at his home in 
order that he might ravish them. And in the opinion writ-
ten by Justice McCarty in this case he said, reading from 
page 252 of the Pacific Reporter: 
"The authorities uniformly hold in this class of cases 
that where a defendant is on trial for a particular 
crime evidence that he on some other occasion com-
mited a separate and distinct crime wholly discon-
nected from the crime charged on some person other 
than the one mentioned in the information or indict-
ment is never admissible. 'Proof of a distinct sub-
stantive offense is never admissible unless there is 
some logical connection between the two from which 
it can be said that proof of the one tends to establish 
the other. Thus in a prosecution for rape testimony 
would not be competent that at a time not compre-
hended within the res gestae the defendant had com-
mitted a rape on another woman.' Gillett, Ind. & Co., 
Ev. No. 57****The same general question was in-
volved in the case of State v. Hillberg, 22 Utah, 27, 
61 Pac. 215. Mr. Justice Miner, speaking for the 
court, said: 'The general rule in criminal cases, sub-
ject to exceptions, is well settled that, where one 
specific offense is charged, the commission of other 
offenses cannot be proven for the purpose of showing 
that the defendant would have been more likely to 
have committed the offense for which he was on 
trial, nor as coiToborating the testimony relating 
thereto; etc.' " 
In line with this is the more recent case of People v. 
Asa vis, a California case reported in 71 Pac. 2, 307, in which 
it was held that evidence of the commission of other similar 
acts by defendant with persons other than the prosecutrix 
are inadmissible, where defendant denied that any improper 
act had taken place and no issue of innocent intent was in-
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volved. Justice Houser in his opinion under paragraph 4, 
-page 309 of the Paficic Reporter, says: 
"From a practical standpoint he (the defendant) is 
helpless under such an accusation, with the result 
that his conviction usually follows. It is for such and 
similar reasons that the courts are so hesitant about 
admitting, especially in the case in chief, evidence· of 
the commission by defendant of other offenses of a 
nature similar to that of which the defendant has 
been charged. Even in criminal cases other than 
those which inv-olve sexual relation:s, the ordinary 
rule is applied, and is the result of recognition of the 
fact that prejudice to the defendant may, and usually 
does, follow from evidence that at some time in the 
past he has committed some other felony. Like most 
rules, that rule has its exceptions. But where no 
exceptions to the general rule is applicable, the courts 
have unhesitatingly announced that for a violation 
of such rule a new trial must be granted." 
Other recent cases in point are: People v. Wertz, 302 
Pac. 2nd, 613, and People v. Buchel 296 Pac. 2nd, 113. 
In Volume 16 of Corpus Juris, at page 610, the rule is 
thus stated : 
"Evidence of assaults by defendant upon, or acts of 
intercourse with, persons other than the prosecutrix 
is not admissible, unless they are parts of the same 
transaction; or unless statements in respect thereto 
are so connected in a confession with statements per-
taining to the offense charged that it is impossible 
to exclude part of the confession without excluding 
all of it; or unless, according to some cases, defend-
ant by his own testimony or otherwise claims an in-
nocent intent." 
And in the instant case, the testimony objected to does 
not fall within any of the exceptions noted and was there-
fore erroneously admitted and could not have done otherwise 
than constitute a vital element in the minds of the jury and 
influenced its verdict, and as a result the defendant did not 
have a fair and impartial trial to which he was entitled. 
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POINT III. THE COURT ERRED IN CHARGING 
THE JURY AS PER HIS INSTRUCTION NO. 9. 
The Court instructed the Jury under its Instruction 
No. 9 as follows : 
"You have heard evidence of conduct of the Defend-
ant, prior in time to the date on which the crime 
charged in the Information is alleged to have been 
committed, similar in nature to the offense charged 
in the information. 
You are instructed that if you find and believe be-
yond a reasonable doubt that such other acts were 
in fact committed by the defendant, such evidence is 
admissible for the sole purpose of showing a system, 
plan, and scheme of the defendant and to prove the 
lustful and lascivious disposition of the defendant 
and as having a tendency to render it more probable 
that acts of s.exual intercourse charged in the inform-
ation were committed on or about the date alleged, 
and for no other purpose." 
This instruction is contrary to the law and it was error 
for the Court to admit such evidence and to instruct the 
jury that it was admissible to show the criminal propensities 
of defendant, contrary to the decision of our Court in the 
case of State v. Baum, 47 Utah 7, 151 Pac. 518, in which it 
was held it was not proper to show convictions of prior of-
fenses to prove probabilities that the defendant was guilty 
of the charged offense, or to show criminal propensities. 
Said instruction should not have been given as it only served 
to add to the prejudicial effect of the evidence that should 
not have been admitted. 
POINT IV. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DE-
FENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL. 
For all of the reasons set forth above, defendant con-
tends the lower Court committed error in denying the mo-
·g 
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tion of the defendant for a new trial, and that fo:fihe reasons 
submitted herein the verdict of the jury should be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
J. VERNON ERICKSON, 
Attorney for Appellant. 
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